What happened
China’s Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, Hu Changchun, held talks with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Asmara on 10 April and met Ethiopian Foreign Affairs State Minister Berhanu Tsegaye and Prime Minister’s Advisor Getachew Reda in Addis Ababa on 14 April.
The shuttle diplomacy marks China’s most visible intervention in the Horn since the 2022 Tigray ceasefire.
Why it matters
Ethiopia and Eritrea are closer to open conflict than at any point since their 1998-2000 border war. A new war between the two Horn neighbours would destabilise shipping through the Red Sea, displace millions of civilians, and threaten aid corridors into Sudan and Somalia.
For South Africa, a Horn conflict would test BRICS solidarity. Both Ethiopia and South Africa are BRICS members, and Pretoria has pushed the bloc to take a more active role in African conflict resolution.
The core dispute
Ethiopia, with 120 million people, is the world’s most populous landlocked country. It lost its coastline when Eritrea gained independence in 1993. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly stated Ethiopia’s “right” to sea access, a position that unites an otherwise fractured nation.
At a military parade in February, Ethiopian soldiers stood below a display reading, “Whether they like it or not, we will not be landlocked.”
Eritrea’s position
Asmara views any discussion of Ethiopian sea access as a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Afwerki has rejected what Eritrea calls “intervention” by outside powers on the issue.
Eritrean troops have reportedly entered border areas in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, raising concerns about a return to the proxy conflicts that devastated the region from 2020 to 2022.
China’s leverage
China holds genuine influence over Eritrea through its dominance of the country’s mining sector. Eritrea has few alternative economic partners of comparable weight.
At the same time, Beijing wants stability in the Horn to protect its investments and the Belt and Road corridor running through Djibouti and Ethiopia. A war between two countries in which China has significant interests would complicate its carefully balanced regional strategy.
What happens next
No mediation framework has been announced. China has not confirmed whether its shuttle diplomacy constitutes formal mediation or routine bilateral engagement. The African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa, has been largely absent from the crisis. Analysts warn that without a credible diplomatic channel, the risk of miscalculation along the militarised border remains high.